Cover letter, resume and other assignments Essay

Introductory letter, continue and different assignments - Essay Example 2. Practice Reflection Form Name: Jane Smith CNO Registration no: L4T 3P4 Zone of training: Occupational Health Position in nursing: Occupational Nurse Wellspring Of Input My Areas of Strengths My Areas for Improvement Self I am able with information on requirements of patients with long haul conditions. I have solid relational abilities, both composed and verbal. I am solid in clinical initiative abilities. I have a capacity to work extended periods and under tension. I am adaptable, excited and solid cooperative person. I have a capacity to convey reliably positive outcomes. Improve certainty to manage difficult and upsetting circumstances practically speaking. Absence of IT aptitudes identified with setting up patient's records, diagrams. Companion My friends see is that I'm a solid cooperative person when we are functioning as a group. They have referenced that I have a unique capacity to determine issues of patients when they are in difficult circumstances. Further my companions referenced that I can make great patient/nurture relationship with focusing on every single individual patient. I need more trust in the activity exercises when I'm managing my subordinates and patients. I have to improve the procedures on persistent consideration and decreasing danger in human services conveyance level. I have to create cooperative ways and dependability when managing patients. Assets I used to think about my training I utilized 'changing patients' universes through nursing practice mastery' online modules. National Council for the Professional Development of Nursing and Midwifery (National Council) Report. I alluded Health Professions Act (HPA) and nursing practice guidelines online report....In this stage abilities should have been wide which is covering all the territories of nursing practice, for example, clinical aptitudes, correspondence and counseling aptitudes, IT aptitudes and authority abilities (Donner, and Wheeler, 2000). 3. Thirdly PDP ought to get endorsed by the training administrator or an appraiser. In this situation it is smarter to offer attention to the medicinal services practice administrator about the expert improvement needs. Hence it will support to the administration to set the preparation and advancement needs as against the current assets and workers.

SOCIETYS SLAVES :: essays research papers

The books Brave New World, by Aldrous Huxley, and 1984, by George Orwell, are indistinguishable in light of the fact that they have practically identical associations. By utilizing indoctrinating strategies, restriction, and the demolition of history, the pioneers in Brave New World and 1984 control the contemplations and memories of the individuals in their social orders. Without utilizing these procedures, the social orders being controlled couldn't exist, in light of the fact that the individuals would not be taught like they should have been. The residents in these social orders are captives of the pioneers, yet can't avoid or successfully change things for themselves.      Mostly, indoctrinating was basic to achieve while the youngsters were youthful in light of the fact that then it would guarantee that they would grow up to be model residents in the general public. Primarily, love was prohibited in the two social orders, by the excellence that it would cause issues. Battles would start over connections that would cause vulnerability that was not required in the general public. At the point when the residents Brave New World were youthful, they were engaged with sexual games that would acquaint them with sex and depict it as something easygoing.                "†¦.this young man appears to be fairly hesitant to                join in the common sexual play."                                    (Brave New World, pg. 30) As they got more seasoned, they couldn't know love, or would not have the option to recognize it from sex, so it turned into the standard to 'have everybody'. In 1984, relationships were permitted, however because the two individuals getting hitched were not in affection. They needed the individuals to feel like they were just persuading hitched to be of administration to the gathering (when their youngsters were set up working with the Spies, growing up to be pawns for the Party). The one they should adore was Big Brother.           "You must love Big Brother. It isn't sufficient to obey him           you must love him." (1984, pg. 201) Everybody was planned so individuals would feel like they were existing for the Party, and the Party is highminded. Individuals' responses towards death was likewise crumbled in Brave New World, so individuals would not show uneasiness on the off chance that one of their companions passed on.           "What are these messy rascals doing here?           It's disgraceful."           "Disgraceful? Yet, I don't get your meaning? They're being passing           conditioned." (Brave New World, pg. 208) They would simply proceed on living in the general public, as existing cheerfully and gainfully was their motivation. In 1984, feelings about events like passing was disliked also.

Safe and Responsible Driving - Free Essay Example

Safe and Responsible Driving Being a safe and responsible driver takes a combination of knowledge, skill and attitude. To begin, you must know the traffic laws and driving practices that help traffic move safely. Breaking these rules of the road is the major cause of collisions. Traffic laws are made by federal, provincial and municipal governments, and police from each level can enforce them. If you break a traffic law, you may be fined, sent to jail or lose your driver’s licence. If you get caught driving while your licence is suspended for a Criminal Code conviction, your vehicle may even be impounded. But you need to do more than just obey the rules. You must care about the safety of others on the road. Everyone is responsible for avoiding collisions. Even if someone else does something wrong, you may be found responsible for a collision if you could have done something to avoid it. Because drivers have to cooperate to keep traffic moving safely, you must also be predic table, doing what other people using the road expect you to do. And you must be courteous. Courteous driving means giving other drivers space to change lanes, not cutting them off and signalling your turns and lane changes properly. You must be able to see dangerous situations before they happen and to respond quickly and effectively to prevent them. This is called defensive or strategic driving. There are collision avoidance courses available where you can practice these techniques. Defensive driving is based on three ideas: visibility, space and communication. . Visibility is about seeing and being seen. You should always be aware of traffic in front, behind and beside you. Keep your eyes constantly moving, scanning the road ahead and to the side and checking your mirrors every five seconds or so. The farther ahead you look, the less likely you will be surprised, and you will have time to avoid any hazards. Make sure other drivers can see you by using your signal lights as requ ired. 2. Managing the space around your vehicle lets you see and be seen and gives you time and space to avoid a collision. Leave a cushion of space ahead, behind and to both sides. Because the greatest risk of a collision is in front of you, stay well back. 3. Communicate with other road users to make sure they see you and know what you are doing. Make eye contact with pedestrians, cyclists and drivers at intersections and signal whenever you want to slow down, stop, turn or change lanes. If you need to get another person’s attention, use your horn.

Essay Cosmetic Surgery - No Longer Only For the Rich and...

Cosmetic surgery companies offer many options in which to finance cosmetic procedures for individual of all income levels. There were over 10 million surgical and nonsurgical cosmetic procedures performed in the United States in 2008, as reported by the American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery (ASAPS). (Surgery, 2009) The statistic mentioned, clearly shows how many of us now would be willing to undergo cosmetic surgery. But, have you asked why? In today’s society, plastic surgery is the number one chosen alternative decision for the augmentation of physical appearance, scar repair and for the repair of a deformity, whether it be a birth defect or disfigurement from an accident. Millions of people, if not all of us are not†¦show more content†¦In addition to aesthetic reasons for desiring to change one’s physical appearance, there are also many psychological issues that contribute to this growing trend of â€Å"quick fixes† (Choosing Cosmetic Surgery, 2010). Aside from overexposure to seemingly impossible to achieve standards of beauty for the ordinary person, people are driven to cosmetic surgery because they suffer from low self-esteem, unhappiness with their own body images and too much insecurity. People who have been called â€Å"fat† or â€Å"ugly† suffer from emotional trauma that lead to a sense of desperation. We are so influenced by the beautiful faces and bodies flashed on the screens of our television, that we try to copy and reinvent ourselves in an attempt to somehow complete the missing part some of us have. Another prevalent reason for plastic surgery is the removal or the lessening of unsightly scars. First, by understanding what scars are and the varying types and degrees of them, we may be able to gain a better understanding as to why so many more people are turning to plastic surgery to repair them. Our skin is a seamless organ that protects our body from infection. Throughout our lives we injure our skin, leaving behind scars. How you scar depends on several factors such as; the depth and size of the injury, your age, heredity and your sex and ethnicity (Scars, 2010). There are 4 types of scars. The first is called a discoloration/surface irregularity or, more commonlyShow MoreRelatedCosmetic Surgery : The Cosmetic World1064 Words   |  5 PagesKosmiah Paige Andrea Hudson-Tomblin English 1101 4 April 2016 The Cosmetic World Many men and women all over the world feel pressured to have the appearance of the â€Å"ideal† beauty, whatever that seems to be. Unfortunately, people cannot change their genetic traits that have made them into whom they have become both physically and mentally. Genetics are a factor in why most individuals choose to get cosmetic surgery done, simply because they are not pleased with what they see in the mirror. Of courseRead MoreMedias Destructive Influence on Women Essay1215 Words   |  5 Pagesideal. This can lead to body dissatisfaction. The second theory is called Gerbner’s cultivation theory. This theory implies that the more television a person watches, the more that person is going to believe what they watch is real life. So if the only image the media is portraying is thin, then woman will believe thin is ideal and realistic. The third and last theory is called Bandura’s social cognitive theory. This theory assumes that people model and learn from t he behaviors of attractive individualsRead MoreCosmetic Surgery And Its Effect On Society1950 Words   |  8 PagesCosmetic surgery is a high in-demand, popular medical procedure that can improve your physical appearance. It can be features on the face or body. This is the general idea behind what we as individuals believe it will do. We believe that surgery will improve how look better, help build higher self-esteem, feel better about ourselves, and grab people’s attention. However, what is the motivation behind why people want to improve their appearance? The influence that society and media have on the populationRead MoreThe Unfortunate Prevalence of Cosmetic Surgery1960 Words   |  8 PagesCosmetic Surgery Today Flipping through the pages of Vogues latest edition, 23 year-old Susan seems quite upset. She struggles with the thought of lacking the perfect body and delicate features in order to be considered attractive. Surprisingly, Susan is not alone in this kind of an internal struggle. In contemporary society, every other woman aspires to have the lips of Angelina Jolie and the perfect jaw line of Keira Knightley. Society today looks down upon individuals that do not fit in, whetherRead MoreCosmetic Surgery for Middle-Aged Women Essay example2262 Words   |  10 Pagestowards cosmetic surgery women. The key question which I will be analyzing will be on (why do early middle age women go though cosmetic surgery?). I will use the current issues in cultural consumer and historic affect on cosmetic surgery for early middle age women. I will be using recent theories and literature on identifying the key elements such as, (body image, aging anxiety, being overweight, media exposure, body dissati sfaction, also a feminist and post feminist perspective of cosmetic surgeryRead MoreCosmetic Enhancement Of The Body And Identity Essay2413 Words   |  10 PagesCosmetic enhancement is the use of medical intervention to achieve a goal that is either socially created, or personally created (Adams, J., 2010). These body improvements are often done to improve one’s self-esteem, romantic life, or to fit within a social or cultural criteria (Adams, 2010). Cosmetic enhancement of the body and identity has always been a luxury in which only the rich and famous could afford, but within our forever developing consumerist society it is becoming more rapidly availableRead MoreCauses of Plastic Surgery Mishaps1658 Words   |  7 Pages1 Causes of Plastic Surgery Mishaps Jill Ayala Eng 101 May 29, 2011 Linda O’Connor 2 Plastic surgery has become an obsession in the United States in the past 10 years. More than 13.1 million procedures were performed in 2010 in the United States, up 2% from 2009 (American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 2010). Today’s society places a great deal of emphasis on physical appearance and people are striving to change their appearance, no matter what the cost. More and more people areRead MorePlastic Surgery : A Image Of A Woman s Appearance3314 Words   |  14 Pagesto make the actress or actor more appealing. Women often try to model themselves after their good looks by buying the same beauty products, getting the same haircut, or even going to the extreme of getting plastic surgery that can cause serious complications or even death. Plastic surgery procedures are painful and gruesome, no woman should be have to feel the pressure to succumb to these monstrous procedure to achieve beauty. What these women don’t know is that all of the images that they have beenRead MoreKylie Kristen Jenner : An Olympic Gold Medalist For Running Track2745 Words   |  11 Pagesgot remarried to Bruce. Bruce Jenner was an Olympic gold medalist for running track. In 2015 Bruce decided that he no longer wanted to pursue the life on a man anymore. He then changed his name to Caitlyn and started off his new life as a 67-year-old transgender. This gender changed caused Kris and now Caitlyn Jenner to get a divorce. Kris and Bruce/Caitlyn had Kylie, and Kylies only biological sister Kendall. Now all the sisters did live togeather in the house with their parents Kris and Bruce. TheyRead MoreHugo Boss Marketing7038 Words   |  29 Pagesarea: Europe 1 °) Hugo Boss Analysis COMPANY In 1837, there was first a partnership between William Procter and James Gamble, in 1937 PG celebrates its 100th anniversary. Sales are up to 230 million dollars. In 1954, PG jumped into the cosmetics and perfumes world with the acquisition of Noxell and its products : Cover Girl, Noxzema and Clarion. In 1993, the sells are up to 30 billion dollars and for the first time more than half of the turnover is realized by international activities.

Impact Of The French Revolution On The West Wind By Percy...

The impact of the French Revolution brought profound change to 18th century Britain. The political practices of the Enlightenment gave way to fresh concepts that transformed all aspects of society, including the arts. Romanticism was born and through it the majestic beauty of nature and her climatic force, influenced a new perception of philosophical and poetic thought. Romantic writers who existed in the wake of the pan-European movement, found a new awareness in nature and viewed it as a sublime entity that mirrored the power and terrors of the human soul. Romantic poetry commonly characterised the beauty of the natural environment as akin to human life and aesthetic experience. This contemplation of the sublime in nature in relation to finding a deeper awareness of self, can be examined through the poetic works of William Wordsworth in his poem ‘The Prelude’ Book II and ‘Ode to the West Wind’ by Percy Bysshe Shelley. Both poets recognised the aesthetic value of nature and its elemental force to illicit wonder and fear within the human mind. However, it is the contrasting modes of poetic language, the construction of verse and individual point of view that separate the ways in which each poet reveals the power and terrors of the inner imaginative life. Written in first person point of view and unrhymed blank verse, ‘The Prelude’ begins with ‘I remember well’, and goes on to recount the poet child s inner fear and distress, of losing his guide near the site of a

Leadership and Management Style of Carlos Slim for Pragmatic

Question: Discuss about theLeadership and Management Style of Carlos Slim for Pragmatic. Answer: Introduction Organizational effectiveness and performance is directly linked to styles of management and leadership that seek to utilize every opportunity. Successful organizations explore the market through business processes that create competitive advantage to allow the organization to compete and perform better against other organizations. Organizations that have a higher success in the world have been established on a set of management, leadership and philosophical concepts that guide the way the organization runs its activities (Nan jundeswaras wamy Swamy, 2014, P. 57). In an ever changing global environment only organizations that are surviving the current economic times are the ones with superior business strategies that guide the way the organization operates. Mullins (2004, P. 13) suggests that such organizations are established on a philosophy that understands the needs of employees and the customers that they serve. This means that they compose of leaders who have put in place strategies to accommodate every need of the employee to ensure that this translates into products and services that such employees give to the customer. This defined as competitive advantage in management terms since it allows organizations to manage the environment that they operate in. This report analyses the inconspicuous Carlos Slim Hilu success in business by analyzing reasons behind the business philosophies, business concepts, leadership styles, employee patterns and the type of power that exists in the organization. Pragmatic reasons for Slims Philanthropy Philanthropy is the love for humanity and caring for other humans through exercising values that emphasis the quality of life through material support. Slim had contributed $40 billion of charity by 2010 through believing that there is need to support the community through such initiatives. However, there are pragmatic reasons behind the philanthropic support that makes him spends lots of money in such initiatives. According to Ke, Qui, Jiang (2015, P. 468) suggest that organizations in the 21st century are focusing on societal issues as a way of appealing to the society that they indeed care about their welfare thus increasing business opportunities within such societies. Management scholars have given philanthropy the new meaning strategic philanthropy that seeks to put the organization at the heart of the community. Safwat (2015) suggests that the relationship between business and society has recently changed and led to new concerns have forced business to reconsider the role the y play in the society. The approach of corporate philanthropy ahs change the way businesses carry out their activities sto ensure that they meet the needs of the communities that they work in. Through philanthropy, Slim develops better relationships with the communities and stakeholders and form informal partnerships with such groups to ensure that the community appreciates the things that they do. This makes the relationship between the business and the community more credible and trustworthy. Through such initiatives, the prospects of the business are supported over long term by the community. This allows the business to account for a wide spectrum of people that it deals with. These philanthropy initiatives, are implemented along a wider range of stakeholders to ensure that business practices are highly acceptable (Hart Milstein, 2003, P. 60). This can be related to the four pillars of social responsibility; economic, ethical, legal and discretionary responsibility. This discretionary practices allow business owners to easily give back to the communities that have contributed to their success. Further Ke, Sun, Wu, 2015)strategic philanthropy is a new strategy un management that is used by many organizations to penetrate the society through giving out philanthropy for business benefits. When the organization supported the need for employees to buy computers through allowin them to deposit for a computer as they pay for their telephone bill, this was a strategic business initiative to benefit the from the society (Hopkins, 2006, P. 22). Later the company started selling computes after its employees had acquired computers. This method links the resources of the organization to a variety of partners to the ground. This is a shift from volunteerism to sharing of community needs and bringing the community closer to the business initiative. This investment are tied to larger investment goals that the organization seeks to achieve in the future. Philanthropy is thus a strategic target for increasing business process and acceptance of the community. Customer lock in Customer lock in is a business strategy used to maintain customers by making them dependent on the particular product that the business offers them without looking for other substitute products. This is thus a customer retention strategy that is employed by organizations in the market by presenting barriers that will keep customers from switching to other suppliers (Sadighi, Mahdi Ghobadi, Hasanpour, 2015, P. 748). Slim used the business model Telmex to lock in customers through a business plan called Gillette that required customers to sign up for prepaid cell-phone service that they needed to used for communication through theTelmex brand. Through buying a handset from the company Slim ensured that the company maintains its customers in the telecommunication industry thus restricting them from choosing other suppliers in the market thus creating competitive advantage. Customers loyalty is achieved through locking in their purchasing options. Business analysts have argued that the only way a business can grow is to lock in its customers and try to focus on oportuionties that will allow the business to grow. Microsoft is another organization that has achieved customer lock in by developing a distinct windows operating system that cannot allow users to easily switch to other windows. It has been argued that the company achieves customer lock in through developing a deeply embedded windows source code system that has many windows application that make it difficult for its users to switch to another product (Zhu Zho, 2011, P. 3). The switching cost of using other windows will mean that users have to rely on products from more than one organization, thus making it easy for Microsoft customers to rely on the system solely. Customers prefer sticking with the challenges associated with the Microsoft program rather than incur the costs of switching (Krogh Hippel, 2006, P. 989). Since Microsoft keeps on upgrading its products, customers are thus satisfied with the challenges and believe the challenges can be addressed. Further, the documents designed from the Microsoft outlook program are not r ewritable or compatible with other products making it difficult for users to rely on other products. Therefore Microsoft uses productd standads that are set so high that places the company as a leader in the softwares that ir designs thus creating a competitive advantage for its products. Ahmad Buttle (2002, P. 151) suggests that customer switching costs are costs associated with from one product to another. This will include elements like effort, time and knowledge of the particular product. Organizations need to understand the customer life cycle process which entails acquisition, retention and development. The customer lock in strategy increases the value of customers while customer development focuses on increasing the value and benefits that the customer gets from the organisation (Weinstein, 2002, P. 263). This leads to benefits like lower customer management costs and thus increase referrals within the market. Carlos leadership styles Leadership entails providing direction, motivating employees and planning activitiess to achieve goals. Leadership styles have varied depending on the nature of the tasks that are being carried out and the nature of people (Assunta, 2007, P. 20). Carlos uses different leadership styles in managing the organization to achieve the best results. It is evident from the case study that leadership styles have heavily contributed to the success of the organization. One style used ins the people-oriented transactional leadership style. Transactional leaders seek to motivate followers with rewards and punishment to achieve results. The leader identifies employee needs and uses rewards to increase performance of such employees. This means that the leader focusses more on efficiency by establishing standard practices to improve the organization. On the other hand people-oriented leadership is based on the relationships that are formed between employees through meeting the expectations and inter actions of subordinates. This entails inspiring people to have confidence in the leadership abilities of their leader (Engelbert Wallgren, 2016, P. 11). People-oriented leaders, therefore, emphasis relationships more than any other thing. Through combining the two strategies, Carlos ensured that there wee good relationships between employees and management to improve business processes. employee involvement was based on the freedom to make business decisions without necessarily relying on the overall boss (DuBrin, 2001, P. 32). This builds confidencee in employees and makes them accountable for every decision that they make. Through developing close relationships with and between employees, Carlos achieved system efficiency and improved standards which led to the best results. Task oriented leadership styles are based on focussing on the tasks that need to be performed within the organization. This allows the leader to concentrate on achieving the goals of the organization. This means that the leader focusses on completing the job thus concentrating on the way the task needs to be done. This will entail coordinating tasks and activitiess and aligning them to the needs of the organization. On the other hand, Forsyth (2010, P. 253) suggests that the autocratic leadership is based on the control of decision making processes within the organisation and limiting the input of other members of the organization. This holding of absolute power is important in critical decisions that need to be made without the involvement of other employees. Carlos used a mixture of this as way of achieving organizational goals through getting tasks done and at the same time making sole critical decisions like developing the Gillette business model. Reserch has show that there is no best leadership style since different situations call for different styles of leadership that can work well. This is the reason why Carlos cannot be associated with any particular leadership style that was used in the case study. Different leadership styles worked well in different situations that the organization was in (Schultz Ellen, 2010, P. 201). In a situation that demanded autocratic, Carlos made the decision alone while in a situation where the decision was to be transactional then employees were involved. Activitiess were run in the organization based on task oriented style while connection between employees were based on a people-oriented style that allowed them to interact. This mixture of ;leadership styles gave the best management style that allowed Carlos to be related to a charismatic leader. Why employees follow Slim Leaders get things done through influencing other people by showing people the right direction and what to put in place to achieve. This is through motivating employees to perform the social contract role of foregoing their own interests and put the organization first (Amar, 2001, P. 11). Good leadership provides competitive advantage for the organization. Carlos has managed to motivate employees because of the leadership attributes and skills that he has. Leadership is a trait that many people are born with thus making it easy for them to easily influence others in the right direction. Raelin (2003, P. 22) suggests that through leadership attributes, leaders influence others through providing direction and solutions for problems that arise. The organization largely dependent on Carlos to make all the major decisions on what needed to be done. Through use of different ;leadership styles, Carlos was abe to satisfy the needs of employees and achieve organizational goals. Employees end up adopting this leadership charisma to the extent that the leadership traits of the leader become organizational culture. The organization consists of irrational and rational followers who have several reasons for following the leader. However, most people follow leaders because of money, status, power, or entry into a meaningful enterprise by following a great leader. In the case of the Carlos, employees who follow the leader focus on the organizational goal of helping the organization to grow to benefit from progress of the organization. Psychoanalysis theory explains that employees follow the leader through dynamic transference that allows them to adopt the strategies put in place by the leader and applying them in their life processes (Maccoby, 2004, pp. 6). The leader follower relationship is achieved through transference from the leader to the follower. The leader will thus transfer the attributes that they have to the subordinates thus making the subordinates to follow them as organizational culture. The type of power that Carlos has Power is the ability to influence others through the authority that one has. Authority is thus the right to exercise power based on the position that one holds either given by the state, knowledge or deity. Leaders use the power and authority that they have to make decisions and influence the direction of others (Maccoby, 2004, PP. 11). This means that leadership is more than management of people and tasks but rather it is a skill that requires knowledge and practice to make it effective. Leaders will exercise different types of power to manage and control those that they lead. Carlos uses legitimate power to manage and control the organization in all perspectives. This is based on the position or role that the individual holds within. The organization is organized in a command and control structure that is dependent on the organizational structure that the organization uses. Through legitimate power, structures in the organization are formalized ion a way that makes puts people in c ertain positions and allows them to make decisions that they are responsible for the decisions that they make. However, leaders need different types of power to lead the organization (Assunta, 2007, P. 21). Different situations may call for different types of power that the leader has to exercise. When employing power leaders need to understand the values of the organization so that the decisions that they make can be in line with the ascribed values of the organization. Further social and emotional competence has to be achieved by leaders as a way of ensuring that they understand different variables that may affect decision making within the organization. Carlos was aware of different attributes within the organization like gender, demography, age and social status that shaped the overall decision that the organization makes. Conclusion It is evident that leaders have different abilities that are key to the success of the organization. Leadership approaches that exist within the organization are based on the leadership style that the leader belies in. These leadership styles are not specific but rather unique and varying from situation to situation. Leaders can influence others to follow then through transference and a build a culture that meets the needs of the organization. The success of Carlos Slim was not based on establishment of unique leadership style but rather a set of leadership strategies that were applied according to the situation that existed. One evident thing from the case study indicates that the management style that was adopted by Carlos was a mixture of several management and leadership styles that were merged together to develop the best strategy. References Ahmad, R., Buttle, F. (2002). Customer retention management, a reflection on theory and practice. Marketing Intelligence and Plannimng, 20(3), 149-161. Amar, A. D. (2001). Managing knowledge workers: Unleashing Productivity . Westport: Quorum books. Assunta, B. M. (2007). Leadership Styles of World's most Admired Companies A Holistic Approach to Measuring Leadership Effectiveness. ernational Conference on Management Science Engineering, (pp. 20-22). DuBrin A., J. (2001). Leadership: Research findings, practice, skills. Boston: Houghton. Engelbert, B., Wallgren, L. G. (2016). The Origins of Task- and People-Oriented Leadership Styles; Remains From Early Attachment Security and Influences During Childhood and Adolescence . Sage Journals. Forsyth, D. R. (2010). Group Dynamics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. Hart, S. L., Milstein M. B. (2003). Creating sustainable value. Academy of Management Executive, 17(2), 56-69. Hopkins, M. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility and International Development: Is Business the Solution? London: Earth Scan Publications Ltd. Ke, J., Sun, J., Wu, D. (2015). Corporate Philanthropic Behavior Scale and Its Impact on Employees Workplace spirituality. Research on Economic and management, 35, 100-108. Ke, J.-L., Qui, X.-W., Jiang, Y.-F. (2015). The effect of corporate philanthropy on organization commitment and job performance of employees; workplace spirituality as mediating variable. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 5, 466-473. Krogh, V., G., Hippel, E. V. (2006). The Promise of research on open source software. Management Science, 52(7), 975-983. Maccoby, M. (2004, September). Why People Follow the Leader: The Power of Transference. The Havard Business Review. Mullins L. (2004). Management and Organisational Behaviour. Prentice Hall: Pearson Higher Education. Nan jundeswaras wamy, T. S., Swamy D. R. (2014). Leadership style. Advances In Management, 7(2), 57-62. Raelin, J. (2003). Creating leaderful organizations: How to bring out lederhsip in everyone. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. Sadighi, M., Mahdi Ghobadi, M., Hasanpour, S. H. (2015). A Conceptual Model for Customer Lock-in Effect in Electronic Business. Proceedings - 12th International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations, (pp. 746-750). Safwat, A. M. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility: Rewriting the Relationship between Business and Society. International Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1), 85-97. Schultz, D. P., Ellen, S. (2010). Psychology and work today : An introduction to industrial and organizational psychology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hal. Weinstein, A. (2002). Customer retention: a usage segmentation and customer value approach. Journal of Targeting, Measurement and Analysis for Marketing, 10(3), 259268. Zhu, K. X., Zho, Z. Z. (2011). Lock-In Strategy in Software Competition: open-Source Software vs. Proprietary Software. Information Systems Research, 1-10.

The Hiring Decision

The hiring decision of the most qualified Deputy Minister of the agency will be based on both the academic qualifications and working experience of the candidates who have applied for the job (Carroll, 1990).Advertising We will write a custom case study sample on The Hiring Decision specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More To begin with, it is vital to underscore the fact that the agency deals with setting safety standards and product testing of all environmental emissions and goods produced from manufacturing plants. Therefore, the most suitable candidate should possess a solid background in environmental science. The ideal candidate should be a specialist on environmental pollution control. Before embarking on the academic qualifications of the candidate, it is profound to highlight the job description criteria that the new Deputy Minister will be expected to deliver while in office. To begin with, the Deputy Minister (DM) will have to ensure that there is thorough compliance with the local, state and national laws that govern the emission of hazardous materials from either manufactured products or factories. The new DM will be expected to be in a position to perform the following key roles: Management and development of information systems that can be used in the process of identifying various locations where hazardous materials are being released. The ability to update and deliver training programs for employees in relation to the emission of dangerous wastes and materials. Active supervision of active contracts that are being carried out in external locations. Examples of contracts include the removal and testing of materials that are hazardous. The ability to initiate thorough investigations regarding complaints emanating from employees especially in regards to harmful exposure to air pollutants and hazardous materials. The ability to enhance accurate maintenance of records by junior officials in the ministry . Records that should be maintained include transportation of hazardous wastes, complaint investigations and chemical inventories. Updating the Minister on both the proposed and current control measures that are linked to various areas of assigned programs. Initiating field work activities with the assistance of junior officers in the ministry. Facilitating regular sampling of wastes that may be harmful from factories. This duty should go hand in hand with screening of materials that are likely to contain heavy particles such as asbestos. The ability to initiate and monitor the process of maintaining inspection and operation schedules. It should be noted that while the above roles and responsibilities are supposed to be performed by the junior environmental specialists in the ministry, the DM is expected to possess similar skills and competences so that he or she is thoroughly updated on the daily activity logs at the ministry (Carroll, 1990). As a matter of fact, the DM must have attained various levels of achievements within his or her area of specialization before being appointed in this position. Required general qualifications The Deputy Minister (DM) should possess adequate working knowledge of environmental pollutants such as industrial gaseous emissions, hazardous pollutants that are manufactured in factories and general harmful materials such as asbestos. The DM should also be in capacity to comprehend and fully apply hazardous materials regulations that have been put in place by the government. He or she should possess ample working experience in relation to the processes of inspecting materials that are hazardous. He or she should be well endowed with excellent relationship, communication and interpersonal skills. Desired academic qualifications In addition to the above general qualifications for the Deputy Minister, he or she will also be assessed in terms of the academic qualifications as follows: Must possess a Bachelor’s degree in eit her physical or biological sciences from any accredited institution of higher learning. Background in environmental science related subjects like Biology and Chemistry. Natural science specialist will also qualify for this position. Advanced degree certification (masters and PhD) in the above mentioned fields. Additional skills and competences The DM should be thoroughly familiar with the tools used in environmental science. Some of these tools include digital survey patterns, soil probes, rain water samples, and mercury monitors. The candidate should posses the ability to utilize graphics and compliance software, be scientifically analytical and also be able to use map creation in a skilful manner. From the above pools of qualifications, it is evident that the Deputy Minister of the agency should be an individual who is adequately conversant with all the critical environmental matters (Carroll, 1990). He or she should have thorough knowledge of the entire system more than any of the environmental officers who have been deployed in the ministry. Therefore, the above criteria will be the most appropriate to use in appointing the Deputy Minister.Advertising Looking for case study on government? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Dr. Murray Lee is apparently the most qualified candidate among the three candidates due to his science background. However, he is no longer interested in the position. As an alternative candidate, Gerard Leclerc can be appointed as the DM due to his background in science. He is the director of the Consumer Scientists Association of Quebec and therefore suitably placed to take over as the Deputy Minister. Reference Carroll, B.W. (1990). Politics and Administration: A Trichotomy?† Governance: An  International Journal of Policy and Administration 4(3), 345-366. This case study on The Hiring Decision was written and submitted by user Nathan Cunningham to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.

A Biography of John Dunstable

A Biography of John Dunstable John Dunstable, (or better known as John Dunstaple), was an English composer estimated to have been born in 1390. His birth date is a conjecture based on his earliest surviving works, which date from around 1410-1420 (Bonds 2006, 112). Based on these works, musicologists are able to make a very educated guess as to his birth date being sometime in 1390. He was born in Dunstable, Bedfordshire during the Late Middle Ages- Early Renaissance era.John Dunstable died on December 24 (Christmas Eve), 1453. This is known due to the fact that it was recorded in his epitaph, which was in the church of St. Stephen Walbrook in London, until it was destroyed in the Great Fire of 1666. As recorded in the early 17th century, his epitaph was recorded to have stated that he had "secret knowledge of the stars". The church of St. Stephen Walbrook was also his burial place (Burkholder 1996, 134).New Grove Theatre Dunstable. I took this. (Nat War...The spelling Dunstaple is generally preferred over Dunsta ble due to the fact that it occurs twice as much in musical attributions of his than that of Dunstable. The few English musical sources are equally divided between "b" and "p"; however, the contemporary non-musical sources, including those with a claim to a direct association to Dunstable, always spelled his name with a "p".Dunstable was believed to be a highly educated, married man, however, nothing is known about his music background/training or early childhood. However, Dunstable was also accredited as an astronomer and mathematician as well as a composer of polyphonic music. In fact, some of his astrological works have even survived in manuscript, possibly in his own hand. Dunstable was known to have been widely connected to that of the royal service, having been in the service of John, Duke of Bedford, the fourth...

5 Coke vs Pepsi 21st Century Case Study

In a â€Å"carefully waged competitive struggle,† from 1975 to 1995 both Coke and Pepsi achieved average annual growth of around 10% as both U. S. nd worldwide CSD consumption consistently rose. According to Roger Enrico, former CEO of Pepsi-Cola: No The warfare must be perceived as a continuing battle without blood. Without Coke, Pepsi would have a tough time being an original and lively competitor. The more successful they are, the sharper we have to be. If the Coca-Cola company didn’t exist, we’d pray for someone to invent them. And on the other side of the fence, I’m sure the folks at Coke would say that nothing contributes as much to the present-day success of the Coca-Cola company than . . . Pepsi. 1 This cozy relationship was threatened in the late 1990s, however, when U. S. CSD consumption dropped for two consecutive years and worldwide shipments slowed for both Coke and Pepsi. In response, both firms began to modify their bottling, pricing, and brand strategies. They also looked to emerging international markets to fuel growth and broadened their brand portfolios to include non-carbonated beverages like tea, juice, sports drinks, and bottled water. Do As the cola wars continued into the twenty-first century, the cola giants faced new challenges: Could they boost flagging domestic cola sales? Where could they find new revenue streams? Was their era of sustained growth and profitability coming to a close, or was this apparent slowdown just another blip in the course of Coke’s and Pepsi’s enviable performance? 1Roger Enrico, The Other Guy Blinked and Other Dispatches from the Cola Wars (New York: Bantam Books, 1988). ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Research Associate Yusi Wang prepared this case from published sources under the supervision of Professor David B. Yoffie. Parts of this case borrow from previous cases prepared by Professors David Yoffie and Michael Porter. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright  © 2002 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www. hbsp. harvard. edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 Economics of the U. S. CSD Industry Americans consumed 23 gallons of CSD annually in 1970 and consumption grew by an average of 3% per year over the next 30 years (see Exhibit 1). This growth was fueled by increasing availability as well as by the introduction and popularity of diet and flavored CSDs. Through the mid-1990s, the real price of CSDs fell, and consumer demand appeared responsive to declining prices. 2 Many alternatives to CSDs existed, including beer, milk, coffee, bottled water, juices, tea, powdered drinks, wine, sports drinks, distilled spirits, and tap water. Yet Americans drank more soda than any other beverage. At 60%-70% market share, the cola segment of the CSD industry maintained its dominance throughout the 1990s, followed by lemon/lime, citrus, pepper, root beer, orange, and other flavors. C CSD consisted of a flavor base, a sweetener, and carbonated water. Four major participants were involved in the production and distribution of CSDs: 1) concentrate producers; 2) bottlers; 3) retail channels; and 4) suppliers. 3 Concentrate Producers The concentrate producer blended raw material ingredients (excluding sugar or high fructose corn syru p), packaged it in plastic canisters, and shipped the blended ingredients to the bottler. The concentrate producer added artificial sweetener to make diet soda concentrate, while bottlers added sugar or high fructose corn syrup themselves. The process involved little capital investment in machinery, overhead, or labor. A typical concentrate manufacturing plant cost approximately $25 million to $50 million to build, and one plant could serve the entire United States. No A concentrate producer’s most significant costs were for advertising, promotion, market research, and bottler relations. Marketing programs were jointly implemented and financed by concentrate producers and bottlers. Concentrate producers usually took the lead in developing the programs, particularly in product planning, market research, and advertising. They invested heavily in their trademarks over time, with innovative and sophisticated marketing campaigns (see Exhibit 2). Bottlers assumed a larger role in developing trade and consumer promotions, and paid an agreed percentage—typically 50% or more—of promotional and advertising costs. Concentrate producers employed extensive sales and marketing support staff to work with and help improve the performance of their bottlers, setting standards and suggesting operating procedures. Concentrate producers also negotiated directly with the bottlers’ major suppliers—particularly sweetener and packaging suppliers—to encourage reliable supply, faster delivery, and lower prices. Do Once a fragmented business with hundreds of local manufacturers, the landscape of the U. S. soft drink industry had changed dramatically over time. Among national concentrate producers, CocaCola and Pepsi-Cola, the soft drink unit of PepsiCo, claimed a combined 76% of the U. S. CSD market in sales volume in 2000, followed by Cadbury Schweppes and Cott Corporation (see Exhibit 3). There were also private label brand manufacturers and several dozen other national and regional producers. Exhibit 4 gives financial data for Coke and Pepsi and their top affiliated bottlers. 2 Robert Tollison et al. , Competition and Concentration (Lexington Books, 1991), p. 11. 3 The production and distribution of non-carbonated soft drinks and bottled water will be discussed in a later section. 2 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century Bottlers Bottlers purchased concentrate, added carbonated water and high fructose corn syrup, bottled or canned the CSD, and delivered it to customer accounts. Coke and Pepsi bottlers offered â€Å"direct store door† (DSD) delivery, which involved route delivery sales people physically placing and managing the CSD brand in the store. Smaller national brands, such as Shasta and Faygo, distributed through food store warehouses. DSD entailed managing the shelf space by stacking the product, positioning the trademarked label, cleaning the packages and shelves, and setting up point-of-purchase displays and end-of-aisle displays. The importance of the bottler’s relationship with the retail trade was crucial to continual brand availability and maintenance. Cooperative merchandising agreements between retailers and bottlers were used to promote soft drink sales. Retailers agreed to specified promotional activity and discount levels in exchange for a payment from the bottler. tC The bottling process was capital-intensive and involved specialized, high-speed lines. Lines were interchangeable only for packages of similar size and construction. Bottling and canning lines cost from $4 million to $10 million each, depending on volume and package type. The minimum cost to build a small bottling plant, with warehouse and office space, was $25million to $35 million. The cost of an efficient large plant, with four lines, automated warehousing, and a capacity of 40 million cases, was $75 million in 1998. 4 Roughly 80-85 plants were required for full distribution across the United States. Among top bottlers in 1998, packaging accounted for approximately half of bottlers’ cost of goods sold, concentrate for one-third, and nutritive sweeteners for one-tenth. Labor accounted for most of the remaining variable costs. Bottlers also invested capital in trucks and distribution networks. Bottlers’ gross profits often exceeded 40%, but operating margins were razor thin. See Exhibit 5 for the cost structures of a typical concentrate producer and bottler. Do No The number of U. S. soft drink bottlers had fallen, from over 2,000 in 1970 to less than 300 in 2000. 6 Historically, Coca-Cola was the first concentrate producer to build nation-wide franchised bottling networks, a move that Pepsi and Cadbury Schweppes followed. The typical franchised bottler owned a manufacturing and sales operation in an exclusive geographic territory, with rights granted in perpetuity by the franchiser. In the case of Coca-Cola, territorial rights did not extend to fountain accounts—Coke delivered to its fountain accounts directly, not through its bottlers. The rights granted to the bottlers were subject to termination only in the event of default by the bottler. The original Coca-Cola franchise contract, written in 1899, was a fixed-price contract that did not provide for contract renegotiation even if ingredient costs changed. With considerable effort, often involving bitter legal disputes, Coca-Cola amended the contract in 1921, 1978, and 1987 to adjust concentrate price. By 1999, over 81% of Coke’s U. S. volume was covered by the 1987 Master Bottler Contract, which granted Coke the right to determine concentrate price and other terms of sale. Under the terms of this contract, Coke was not obligated to share advertising and marketing expenditures with the bottlers; however, the company often did in order to ensure quality and proper distribution of marketing. In 2000, Coke contributed $766 million in marketing support and $223 million in infrastructure support to its top bottler alone. The 1987 contract did not give complete pricing control to Coke, but rather used a pricing formula that adjusted quarterly for changes in sweetener prices and stated a maximum price. This contract differed from Pepsi’s Master Bottling Agreement with its top bottler, which granted the bottler 4 â€Å"Louisiana Coca-Cola Reveals Crown Jewel,† Beverage Industry, January 1999. 5 Calculated from M. Dolan et al. , â€Å"Coca-Cola Beverages,† Merrill Lynch Capital Markets, July 6, 1998. Timothy Muris et al. , Strategy, Structure, and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft-Drink Industry, (Quorum Books, 1993), p. 63; John C. Maxwell, ed. Beverage Digest Fact Book 2001. 3 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 perpet ual rights to distribute Pepsi cola products while at the same time required it to purchase its raw materials from Pepsi at prices, and on terms and conditions, determined by Pepsi. Pepsi negotiated concentrate prices with its bottling association, and normally based price increases on the CPI. Coke and Pepsi both raised concentrate prices throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, even as the real (inflation-adjusted) retail prices for CSD were down (see Exhibit 6). tC Coca-Cola and Pepsi franchise agreements allowed bottlers to handle the non-cola brands of other concentrate producers. Franchise agreements also allowed bottlers to choose whether or not to market new beverages introduced by the concentrate producer. Some restrictions applied, however, as bottlers could not carry directly competitive brands. For example, a Coca-Cola bottler could not sell Royal Crown Cola, but it could distribute Seven-Up, if it decided not to carry Sprite. Franchised bottlers had the freedom to participate in or reject new package introductions, local advertising campaigns and promotions, and test marketing. The bottlers also had the final say in decisions concerning retail pricing, new packaging, selling, advertising, and promotions in its territory, though they could only use packages authorized by the franchiser. In 1971, the Federal Trade Commission initiated action against eight major CPs, charging that exclusive territories granted to franchised bottlers prevented intrabrand competition (two or more bottlers competing in the same area with the same beverage). The CPs argued that interbrand competition was sufficiently strong to warrant continuation of the existing territorial agreements. After nine years of litigation, Congress enacted the â€Å"Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act† in 1980, preserving the right of CPs to grant exclusive territories. Retail Channels No In 2000, the distribution of CSDs in the United States took place through food stores (35%), fountain outlets7 (23%), vending machines (14%), convenience stores (9%), and other outlets (20%). Mass merchandisers, warehouse clubs, and drug stores made up most of the last category. Bottlers’ profitability by type of retail outlet is shown in Exhibit 7. Costs were affected by delivery method and frequency, drop size, advertising, and marketing. The main distribution channel for soft drinks was the supermarket. CSDs were among the five largest selling product lines sold by supermarkets, raditionally yielding a 15%-20% gross margin (about average for food products) and accounting for 3%-4% of food store revenues. 8 CSDs represented a large percentage of a supermarket’s business, and were also a big traffic draw. Bottlers fought for retail shelf space to ensure visibility and accessibility for their products, and looked for new locations to increase impulse purchases, such as placing coolers at checkout counters. The proliferation of products and packaging types created intense shelf space pressures. Do Discount retailers, warehouse clubs, and drug stores accounted about 15% of CSD sales in the late 1990s. These firms often had their own private label CSD, or they sold a generic label such as President’s Choice. Private label CSDs were usually delivered to a retailer’s warehouse, while branded CSDs were delivered directly to the store. With the warehouse delivery method, the retailer was responsible for storage, transportation, merchandising, and stocking the shelves, thus incurring additional costs. The word â€Å"fountain outlets† traditionally referred to soda fountains, but was later used also for restaurants, cafeterias, and other establishments that served soft drinks by the glass using fountain dispensers. 8 Progressive Grocer 1998 Sales Manual Databook, July 1998, p. 68. 4 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century tC Hi storically, Pepsi had focused on sales through retail outlets, while Coke had dominated fountain sales. Coca-Cola had a 65% share of the fountain market in 2000, while Pepsi had 21%. Competition for fountain sales was intense. National fountain accounts were essentially â€Å"paid sampling,† with CSD companies earning pretax operating margins of around 2%. For restaurants, by contrast, fountain sales were extremely profitable—about 80 cents out of every dollar spent stayed with the restaurant retailers. In 1999, for example, Burger King franchisees were believed to pay about $6. 20 per gallon for Coke syrup, but they received a substantial rebate on each gallon in the form of a check; one large Midwestern Burger King franchisee said his annual rebate ran $1. 45 per gallon, or about 23%. Coke and Pepsi also invested in the development of fountain equipment, such as service dispensers, and provided their fountain customers with cups, point-of-sale material, advertising, and in-store promotions to increase brand presence. After Pepsi entered the fast-food restaurant business with the acquisitions of Pizza Hut (1978), Taco Bell (1986), and Kentucky Frie d Chicken (1986), Coca-Cola persuaded other chains such as Wendy’s and Burger King to switch to Coke. PepsiCo spun its restaurant business off to the public in 1997 under the name Tricon, while retaining the Frito-Lay snack food business. In 2000, fountain â€Å"pouring rights† remained split along pre-Tricon lines, as Pepsi supplied all of Taco Bell’s and KFC’s, and the overwhelming majority of Pizza Hut restaurants. Coke retained exclusivity deals with McDonald’s and Burger King. No Coke and Cadbury Schweppes handled fountain accounts from their national franchisor companies. Employees of the franchisee companies negotiated and signed pouring rights contracts which, in the case of big restaurant chains, could cover the entire United States or even the world. The accounts were actually serviced by employees of the franchisors’ fountain divisions, local bottlers, or both. Local bottlers, when they were used, were paid service fees for delivering syrup and fixing and placing machines. Historically, PepsiCo could only sell directly to end-user national accounts. By 1999, Pepsi had persuaded most of its bottlers to modify their franchise agreements to allow Pepsi to sell fountain syrup via restaurant commissary companies, which sell a range of supplies to restaurants. Concentrate producers offered bottlers rebates to encourage them to purchase and install vending machines. The owners of the property on which vending equipment was located usually received a sales commission. Coke and Pepsi were the largest suppliers of CSDs to the vending channel. Juice, tea, sports drinks, lemonade, and water were also available through vending machines. Suppliers to Concentrate Producers and Bottlers Do Concentrate producers required few inputs: the concentrate for most regular colas consisted of caramel coloring, phosphoric and/or citric acid, natural flavors, and caffeine. 10 Bottlers purchased two major inputs: packaging, which included $3. 4 billion in cans, $1. 3 billion in plastic bottles, and $0. 6 billion in glass; and sweeteners, which included $1. 1 billion in sugar and high fructose corn syrup, and $1. billion in artificial sweetener (predominantly aspartame). The majority of U. S. CSDs were packaged in metal cans (60%), then plastic bottles (38%), and glass bottles (2%). Cans were an attractive packaging material because they were easily handled, stocked, and displayed, weighed little, and were durable and recyclable. Plastic bottles, introduced in 1978, bo osted home consumption of CSDs because of their larger 1-liter, 2-liter, and 3-liter sizes. Single-serve 20-oz. PET bottles quickly gained popularity and represented 35% of vended drinks and 3% of grocery drinks in 2000. Nikhil Deogun and Richard Gibson, â€Å"Coke Beats Out Pepsi for Contracts With Burger King, Domino’s,† The Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1999. 10 Based on ingredients lists, Coke Classic and Pepsi-Cola, 2001. 5 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 The concentrate producers’ strategy towards can manufacturers was typical of their supplier relationships. Coke and Pepsi negotiated on behalf of their bottling networks, and were among the metal can industry’s largest customers. Since the can constituted about 40% of the total cost of a packaged beverage, bottlers and concentrate producers often maintained relationships with more than one supplier. In the 1960s and 1970s, Coke and Pepsi backward integrated to make some of their own cans, but largely exited the business by 1990. In 1994, Coke and Pepsi instead sought to establish stable long-term relationships with their suppliers. Major can producers included American National Can, Crown Cork Seal, and Reynolds Metals. Metal cans were viewed as commodities, and there was chronic excess supply in the industry. Often two or three can manufacturers competed for a single contract. Early History11 tC The Evolution of the U. S. Soft Drink Industry Coca-Cola was formulated in 1886 by John Pemberton, a pharmacist in Atlanta, Georgia, who sold it at drug store soda fountains as a â€Å"potion for mental and physical disorders. † A few years later, Asa Candler acquired the formula, established a sales force, and began brand advertising of Coca-Cola. Tightly guarded in an Atlanta bank vault, the formula for Coca-Cola syrup, known as â€Å"Merchandise 7X,† remained a well-protected secret. Candler granted Coca-Cola’s first bottling franchise in 1899 for a nominal one dollar, believing that the future of the drink rested with soda fountains. The company’s bottling network grew quickly, however, reaching 370 franchisees by 1910. No In its early years, Coke was constantly plagued by imitations and counterfeits, which the company aggressively fought in court. In 1916 alone, courts barred 153 imitations of Coca-Cola, including the brands Coca-Kola, Koca-Nola, Cold-Cola, and the like. Coke introduced and patented a unique 6. 5ounce â€Å"skirt† bottle to be used by its franchisees that subsequently became an American icon. Robert Woodruff, who became CEO in 1923, began working with franchised bottlers to make Coke available wherever and whenever a consumer might want it. He pushed the bottlers to place the beverage â€Å"in arm’s reach of desire,† and argued that if Coke were not conveniently available when the consumer was thirsty, the sale would be lost forever. During the 1920s and 1930s, Coke pioneered open-top coolers to storekeepers, developed automatic fountain dispensers, and introduced vending machines. Woodruff also initiated â€Å"lifestyle† advertising for Coca-Cola, emphasizing the role of Coke in a consumer’s life. Do Woodruff also developed Coke’s international business. In the onset of World War II, at the request of General Eisenhower, he promised that â€Å"every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca-Cola for five cents wherever he is and whatever it costs the company. † Beginning in 1942, Coke was exempted from wartime sugar rationing whenever the product was destined for the military or retailers serving soldiers. Coca-Cola bottling plants followed the movements of American troops; 64 bottling plants were set up during the war—largely at government expense. This contributed to Coke’s dominant market shares in most European and Asian countries. Pepsi-Cola was invented in 1893 in New Bern, North Carolina by pharmacist Caleb Bradham. Like Coke, Pepsi adopted a franchise bottling system, and by 1910 it had built a network of 270 11 See J. C. Louis and Harvey Yazijian, The Cola Wars (Everest House, 1980); Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country, and Coca-Cola (Charles Scribner’s, 1993); David Greising, I’d Like the World to Buy a Coke (John Wiley Sons, 1997). 6 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. du or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century franchised bottlers. Pepsi struggled, however, declaring bankruptcy in 1923 and again in 1932. Business began to pick up in the midst of the Great Depression, when Pepsi lowered the price for its 12-ounce bottle to a nickel, the same price Coke charged for its 6. 5-ounce bottle. When Pepsi tried to expand its bottling network in the late 1930s, its choices were small local bottlers striving to compete with wealthy Coke franchisees. 12 Pepsi nevertheless began to gain market share. In 1938, Coke filed suit against Pepsi, claiming that Pepsi-Cola was an infringement on the CocaCola trademark. The court ruled in favor of Pepsi in 1941, ending a series of suits and countersuits between the two companies. With its famous radio jingle, â€Å"Twice as Much, for Nickel Too,† Pepsi’s U. S. sales surpassed those of Royal Crown and Dr Pepper in the 1940s, trailing only Coca-Cola. In 1950, Coke’s share of the U. S. CSD market was 47% and Pepsi’s was 10%; hundreds of regional CSD companies continued to produce a wide assortment of flavors. tC The Cola Wars Begin In 1950, Alfred Steele, a former Coca-Cola marketing executive, became Pepsi’s CEO. Steele made â€Å"Beat Coke† his theme and encouraged bottlers to focus on take-home sales through supermarkets. The company introduced the first 26-ounce bottles to the market, targeting family consumption, while Coke stayed with its 6. 5-ounce bottle. Pepsi’s growth soon began tracking the growth of supermarkets and convenience stores in the United States: There were about 10,000 supermarkets in 1945, 15,000 in 1955, and 32,000 at the peak in 1962. No In 1963, under the leadership of new CEO Donald Kendall, Pepsi launched its â€Å"Pepsi Generation† campaign that targeted the young and â€Å"young at heart. † Pepsi’s ad agency created an intense commercial using sports cars, motorcycles, helicopters, and a catchy slogan. The campaign helped Pepsi narrow Coke’s lead to a 2-to-1 margin. At the same time, Pepsi worked with its bottlers to modernize plants and improve store delivery services. By 1970, Pepsi’s franchise bottlers were generally larger compared to Coke bottlers. Coke’s bottling network remained fragmented, with more than 800 independent franchised bottlers that focused mostly on U. S. cities of 50,000 or less. 13 Throughout this period, Pepsi sold concentrate to its bottlers at a price approximately 20% lower than Coke. In the early 1970s, Pepsi increased the concentrate price to equal that of Coke. To overcome bottlers’ opposition, Pepsi promised to use the extra margin to increase advertising and promotion. Do Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola began to experiment with new cola and non-cola flavors and a variety of packaging options in the 1960s. Before then, the two companies had adopted a single product strategy, selling only their flagship brand. Coke introduced Fanta (1960), Sprite (1961), and lowcalorie Tab (1963). Pepsi countered with Teem (1960), Mountain Dew (1964), and Diet Pepsi (1964). Each introduced non-returnable glass bottles and 12-ounce metal cans in various packages. Coke and Pepsi also diversified into non-soft-drink industries. Coke purchased Minute Maid (fruit juice), Duncan Foods (coffee, tea, hot chocolate), and Belmont Springs Water. Pepsi merged with snackfood giant Frito-Lay in 1965 to become PepsiCo, claiming synergies based on shared customer targets, store-door delivery systems, and marketing orientations. In the late 1950s, Coca-Cola, still under Robert Woodruff’s leadership, began using advertising that finally recognized the existence of competitors, such as â€Å"American’s Preferred Taste† (1955) and â€Å"No Wonder Coke Refreshes Best† (1960). In meetings with Coca-Cola bottlers, however, executives only discussed the growth of their own brand and never referred to its closest competitor by name. 2 Louis and Yazijian, p,. 23. 13 Pendergrast, p. 310. 7 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 During the 1960s, Coke primarily focused on overseas markets, apparently believing that domestic soft drink consumption had neared saturation at 22. 7 ga llons per capita in 1970. 14 Pepsi meanwhile battled aggressively in the United States, doubling its share between 1950 and 1970. The Pepsi Challenge In 1974, Pepsi launched the â€Å"Pepsi Challenge† in Dallas, Texas. Coke was the dominant brand in the city and Pepsi ran a distant third behind Dr Pepper. In blind taste tests hosted by Pepsi’s small local bottler, the company tried to demonstrate that consumers in fact preferred Pepsi to Coke. After its sales shot up in Dallas, Pepsi started to roll out the campaign nationwide, although many of its franchise bottlers were initially reluctant to join. tC Coke countered with rebates, rival claims, retail price cuts, and a series of advertisements questioning the tests’ validity. In particular, Coke used retail price discounts selectively in markets where the Coke bottler was company owned and the Pepsi bottler was an independent franchisee. Nonetheless, the Pepsi Challenge successfully eroded Coke’s market share. In 1979, Pepsi passed Coke in food store sales for the first time with a 1. 4 share point lead. Breaking precedent, Brian Dyson, president of Coca-Cola, inadvertently uttered the name â€Å"Pepsi† in front of Coke’s bottlers at the 1979 bottlers conference. No During the same period, Coke was renegotiating its franchise bottling contract to obtain greater flexibility in pricing concentrate and syrups. Bottlers approved the new contract in 1978 only after Coke conceded to link concentrate price changes to the CPI, adjust the price to reflect any cost savings associated with a modification of ingredients, and supply unsweetened concentrate to bottlers who preferred to purchase their own sweetener on the open market. 15 This brought Coke’s policies in line with Pepsi, which traditionally sold its concentrate unsweetened to its bottlers. Immediately after securing bottler approval, Coke announced a significant concentrate price hike. Pepsi followed with a 15% price increase of its own. Cola Wars Heat Up In 1980, Cuban-born Roberto Goizueta was named CEO and Don Keough president of Coca-Cola. In the same year, Coke switched from sugar to the lower-priced high fructose corn syrup, a move Pepsi emulated three years later. Coke also intensified its marketing effort, increasing advertising spending from $74 million to $181 million between 1981 and 1984. Pepsi elevated its advertising expenditure from $66 million to $125 million over the same period. Goizueta sold off most of the non-CSD businesses he had inherited, including wine, coffee, tea, and industrial water treatment, while keeping Minute Maid. Do Diet Coke was introduced in 1982 as the first extension of the â€Å"Coke† brand name. Much of CocaCola management referred to its brand as â€Å"Mother Coke,† and considered it too sacred to be extended to other products. Despite internal opposition from company lawyers over copyright issues, Diet Coke was a phenomenal success. Praised as the â€Å"most successful consumer product launch of the Eighties,† it became within a few years not only the nation’s most popular diet soft drink, but also the third-largest selling soft drink in the United States. 14 Maxwell. 15 Pendergrast, p. 323. 8 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century In April 1985, Coke announced the change of its 99-year-old Coca-Cola formula. Explaining this radical break with tradition, Goizueta saw a sharp depreciation in the value of the Coca-Cola trademark as â€Å"the product had a declining share in a shrinking segment of the market. †16 On the day of Coke’s announcement, Pepsi declared a holiday for its employees, claiming that the new Coke tasted more like Pepsi. The reformulation prompted an outcry from Coke’s most loyal customers. Bottlers joined the clamor. Three months later, the company brought back the original formula under the name Coca-Cola Classic, while retaining the new formula as the flagship brand under the name New Coke. Six months later, Coke announced that Coca-Cola Classic (the original formula) would henceforth be considered its flagship brand. tC New CSD brands proliferated in the 1980s. Coke introduced 11 new products, including Cherry Coke, Caffeine-Free Coke, and Minute-Maid Orange. Pepsi introduced 13 products, including Caffeine-Free Pepsi-Cola, Lemon-Lime Slice, and Cherry Pepsi. The number of packaging types and sizes also increased dramatically, and the battle for shelf space in supermarkets and other food stores grew fierce. By the late 1980s, both Coke and Pepsi offered more than ten major brands, using at least seventeen containers and numerous packaging options. 17 The struggle for market share intensified and the level of retail price discounting increased sharply. Consumers were constantly exposed to cents-off promotions and a host of other supermarket discounts. No Throughout the 1980s, the smaller concentrate producers were increasingly squeezed by Coke and Pepsi. As their shelf-space declined, small brands were shuffled from one owner to another. Over five years, Dr Pepper was sold (all and in part) several times, Canada Dry twice, Sunkist once, Shasta once, and AW Brands once. Some of the deals were made by food companies, but several were leveraged buyouts by investment firms. Philip Morris acquired Seven-Up in 1978 for a big premium, but despite superior brand rankings and established distribution channels, racked up huge losses in the early 1980s and exited in 1985. (Exhibit 8a shows the brand performance of top companies, as ranked by retailers. ) In the 1990s, through a series of strategic acquisitions, Cadbury Schweppes emerged as the clear (albeit distant) third-largest concentrate producer, snapping up the Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Companies (1995) and Snapple Beverage Group (2000). (Appendix A describes Cadbury Schweppes’ operations and financial performance. ) Bottler Consolidation and Spin-Off Do Relations between Coke and its franchised bottlers had been strained since the contract renegotiation of 1978. Coke struggled to persuade bottlers to cooperate in marketing and promotion programs, upgrade plant and equipment, and support new product launches. 8 The cola wars had particularly weakened small independent franchised bottlers. High advertising spending, product and packaging proliferation, and widespread retail price discounting raised capital requirements for bottlers, while lowering their margins. Many bottlers that had been owned by one family for several generations no longer had the resources or the commitment to be competitive. At a July 1980 dinner with Coke’s fifteen largest domestic bottlers, Goizueta announced a plan to refranchise bottling operations. Coke began buying up poorly managed bottlers, infusing capital, 6 The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1986. 17 Timothy Muris, David Scheffman, and Pablo Spiller, Strategy, Structure, and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry. (Quorum Books, 1993), p. 73. 18 Greising, p. 88. 9 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 and quickly reselling them to better-performing bottlers. Refranchising allowed Coke’s larger bottlers to expand outside their traditionally exclusive geographic territories. When two of its largest bottling companies came up for sale in 1985, Coke moved swiftly to buy them for $2. 4 billion, preempting outside financial bidders. Together with other bottlers that Coke had recently bought, these acquisitions placed one-third of Coca-Cola’s volume in company-owned bottlers. In 1986, Coke began to replace its 1978 franchise agreement with the Master Bottler Contract that afforded Coke much greater freedom to change concentrate price. tC Coke’s bottler acquisitions had increased its long-term debt to approximately $1 billion. In 1986, on the initiative of Doug Ivester, who later became CEO, the company created an independent bottling subsidiary, Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE), and sold 51% of its shares to the public, while retaining the rest. The minority equity position enabled Coke to separate its financial statements from CCE. As Coke’s first so-called â€Å"anchor bottler,† CCE consolidated small territories into larger regions, renegotiated with suppliers and retailers, merged redundant distribution and material purchasing, and cut its work force by 20%. CCE moved towards mega-facilities, investing in 50 million-case production lines with high levels of automation. Coke continued to acquire independent franchised bottlers and sell them to CCE. 19 â€Å"We became an investment banking firm specializing in bottler deals,† reflected Don Keough. In 1997 alone, Coke put together more than $7 billion in deals involving bottlers. 20 By 2000, CCE was Coke’s largest bottler with annual sales of more than $14. 7 billion, handling 70% of Coke’s North American volume. Some industry observers questioned Coke’s accounting practice, as Coke retained substantial managerial influence in its arguably independent anchor bottler. 21 No In the late 1980s, Pepsi also acquired MEI Bottling for $591 million, Grand Metropolitan’s bottling operations for $705 million, and General Cinema’s bottling operations for $1. 8 billion. The number of Pepsi bottlers decreased from more than 400 in the mid-1980s to less than 200 in the mid-1990s. Pepsi owned about half of these bottling operations outright and held equity positions in most of the rest. Experience in the snack food and restaurant businesses boosted Pepsi’s confidence in its ability to manage the bottling business. In the late 1990s, Pepsi changed course and also adopted the anchor bottler model. In April 1999, the Pepsi Bottling Group (PBG) went public, with Pepsi retaining a 35% equity stake. By 2000, PBG produced 55% of PepsiCo beverages in North America and 32% worldwide. As Craig Weatherup, PBG’s chairman/CEO, explained, â€Å"Our success is interdependent, with PepsiCo the keeper of the brands and PBG the keeper of the marketplace. In that regard, we’re joined at the hip. †22 Do The bottler consolidation of the 1990s made smaller concentrate producers increasingly dependent on the Pepsi and Coke bottling network to distribute their products. In response, Cadbury Schweppes in 1998 bought and merged two large U. S. bottlers to form its own bottler. In 2000, Coke’s bottling system was the most consolidated, with its top 10 bottlers producing 94% of domestic volume. Pepsi’s and Cadbury Schweppes’ top 10 bottlers produced 85% and 71% of the domestic volume of their respective franchisors. 19 Greising, p. 292. 20 Beverage Industry, January 1999, p. 17. 21 Albert Meyer and Dwight Owsen, â€Å"Coca-Cola’s Accounting,† Accounting Today, September 28, 1998 22 Kent Steinriede, â€Å"PBG Charts Its Own Course,† Beverage Industry, May 1, 1999. 10 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Adapting to the Times 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century In the late 1990s, a variety of problems began to emerge for the soft drink industry as a whole. Although Americans still drank more CSDs than any other beverage, U. S. sales volume registered only a 0. 2% increase in 2000, to just under 10 billion cases (a case was equivalent to 24 eight-ounce containers, or 192 ounces). This slow growth was in contrast to the 5%-7% annual growth in the United States during the 1980s. Concurrently, financial crisis in various parts of the world left Coke and Pepsi bottlers over-invested and under-utilized. tC Coca-Cola was also impacted by difficulties in leadership transition. After the death of the popular CEO Roberto Goizueta in 1997, his successor Douglas Ivestor had two rocky years at the helm, during which Coke faced a high-profile race discrimination suit and a European public relations scandal after hundreds of people became ill from contaminated soft drinks. Douglas Daft assumed leadership in April 2000; one of his first moves was to lay off 5,200 employees, or 20% of worldwide staff. While expressing â€Å"enthusiastic support for the current strategic course of the Company under Doug Daft’s leadership,† Coke’s Board voted against Daft’s eleventh-hour negotiations to acquire Quaker Oats in November 2000. As they had numerous times over the last century, analysts predicted the end of Coke and Pepsi’s stellar growth and profitability. Meanwhile, Coke and Pepsi turned their attention to bolstering domestic markets, diversifying into non-carbonated beverages (non-carbs), and cultivating international markets. Balancing Market Growth, Market Share, and Profitability in the United States No During the early 1990s, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo bottlers employed a low-price strategy in the supermarket channel in order to compete more effectively with high-quality, low-price store brands. As the threat of the low-priced brands lessened, CCE responded in March 1999 with its first major price increase at the retail level after 20 years of flat take-home pricing. Its strategy was to reposition Coke Classic as a premium brand. PBG followed that price increase shortly after. Price wars had driven soda prices down to the point where bottlers couldn’t get a decent return on supermarket sales,† explained a Pepsi executive. 23 Observed one industry analyst, â€Å"Coke’s growth is coming internationally, and Pepsi’s is coming from Frito-Lay. It is in the companies’ mutual best interest not to destroy the domestic market and eat up each other’s share. † 24 Consume rs’ initial reaction to price increases was a reduction in supermarket purchases. When CCE raised prices in supermarkets by 6. 0%-8. 0% in both 1999 and 2000, comparable volumes in North America declined each year (1. % in 1999 and 0. 8% in 2000). In 2001, however, the bottling companies effected more moderate price increases and consumer demand appeared to be on the upswing. Do Both Coke and Pepsi also set about to boost the flagging cola market in other ways, including exclusive marketing agreements with Britney Spears (Pepsi) and Harry Potter (Coke). Pepsi reintroduced the highly effective â€Å"Pepsi Challenge,† which was designed to boost overall cola sales and draw consumers away from private labels as much as it was to plug Pepsi over Coke. In contrast to the supermarket channel, Coke and Pepsi’s rivalry in the fountain channel intensified in the late 1990s. To penetrate Coke’s stronghold, Pepsi aggressively pursued national 23 Lauren R. Rublin, â€Å"Chipping Away: Coca-Cola Could Learn a Thing or Two from the Renaissance at PepsiCo,† Barron’s, June 12, 2000. 24 Rublin. 11 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 accounts, forcing Coke to make costly concessions to retain its biggest customers. Pepsi broke Coke’s stronghold at Disney with a 1998 contract to supply soft drinks at the new DisneyQuest, Club Disney and ESPN Zone chains. After a heated bidding war in 1999 over the 10,000-store chain of Burger King Corporation, Coke again won the fountain contract involving $220 million per year for 40 million gallons of syrup soda, but only after agreeing to double its $25 million in rebates to the food chain. Pepsi also sued Coke over access to the fountain market, charging Coke with â€Å"attempting to monopolize the market for fountain-dispensed soft drinks through independent foodservice distributors throughout the United States. Coke persuaded a Federal court to dismiss the suit in 2000. Despite Pepsi’s efforts, at the end of 2000, Coke still dominated the fountain market with 65% share of national â€Å"pouring rights† to Pepsi’s 21% and Dr Pepper/Seven Up’s 14%. tC The Rise of Non-Cola Beverages As consumer trends shifted from diet soda , to lemon-lime, to tea-based drinks, to other popular non-carbs, Coke and Pepsi vigorously expanded their brand portfolios. Each new product was accompanied by debate on how much each company should stray from its core product: regular cola. On one hand, cola sales consistently dwarfed alternative beverages sales, and cola-defenders expressed concern that over-enthusiastic expansion would distract the company from its flagship product. Also, history had shown that explosions in demand for alternative drinks were regularly followed by slow or negative growth. On the other hand, as domestic cola demand appeared to plateau, alternative beverages could provide a growth engine for the firms. No By the late 1990s, the soft drink industry had seen various alternative beverage categories come and go. From double-digit expansion in the late 1980s, diet CSDs peaked in 1991 at 29. 8% of the CSD segment and then declined to their 1988-level share of 24. 4% in 1999. PepsiCo’s introduction of Pepsi One in late 1998 was partially responsible for the minor recovery of the diet drink segment. Flavored soft drinks such as citrus, lemon-lime, pepper, and root beer were also popular. In 1999, Mountain Dew grew faster than any other CSD brand for the third year in a row, posting 6. 0% volume growth, but in 2000, its growth slowed to 1. 5% due to competing â€Å"new-age† non-carbs. Do At the turn of this century, CSDs accounted for 41. 3% of total non-alcoholic beverage consumption, bottled water accounted for 10. 3%, and other non-carbs accounted for the remainder. 25 When measured in gallons, sales of non-carbs rose by 18% in 1995 and 5% in 2000, compared to 3% and 0. 2% respectively for CSDs. The drinks with high growth and high hype were non-carbs such as juices/juice drinks, sports drinks, tea-based drinks, dairy-based drinks—and especially bottled water. In the 1990s, the bottled water industry grew on average 8. 3% per year, and volume reached more than 5 billion gallons in 2000. Revenue growth outpaced volume growth, with a 9. 3% increase to approximately $5. 6 billion, and per capita consumption gained 5. 1 gallons to 13. 2 gallons per person. Pepsi’s Aquafina went national in 1998. Coke followed in 1999 with Dasani. Though Pepsi and Coke sold reverse-osmosis purified water instead of spring water, they had a distribution advantage over competing water brands. 26 Coke and Pepsi launched other new drinks throughout the 1990s. They also aggressively acquired brands that rounded out their portfolios, including Tropicana (Pepsi, 1998), Gatorade (Pepsi, 5 Maxwell. Does not include â€Å"tap water / hybrids / all others† category. 26 Reverse osmosis is a method of producing pure water by forcing saline or impure water through a semi-permeable membrane across which salts or impurities cannot pass. 12 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in t he Twenty-First Century 2000), and SoBe (Pepsi, 2000). Both companies predicted that future increases in market share would come from beverages other than CSDs. Pepsi pronounced itself a â€Å"total beverage company,† and Coca-Cola appeared to be moving in the same direction, recasting its performance metric from share of the soda market to â€Å"share of stomach. † â€Å"If Americans want to drink tap water, we want it to be Pepsi tap water,† said Pepsi’s vice-president for new business, describing the philosophy behind the new strategy. 27 Coke’s Goizueta had echoed the same view: â€Å"Sometimes I think we even compete with soup. †28 Though cola remained the clear leader in terms of both companies’ volume sales, both Coke and Pepsi relied heavily on non-carbs to stimulate their overall growth in the late 1990s. In 1999, non-carbs accounted for 80% of Pepsi’s and more than 100% of Coke’s growth. 29 tC At the turn of the century, Pepsi had the lion’s share of non-CSD sales. Pepsi led Coke by a wide margin in 2000 volume sales in three key segments: Gatorade (76%) led PowerAde (15%) in the $2. 6billion sports drinks segment, Lipton (38%) led Nestea (27%) in the $3. 5-billion tea-based drinks segment, and Aquafina (13%) led Dasani (8%) in the $6. 0-billion bottled water segment. 30 Including multi-serve juices, Tropicana held an approximate 44% share of the $3-billion chilled orange juice market, more than twice that of Minute Maid. 1 With the acquisition of Quaker and South Beach Beverages, Pepsi raised its non-carb market share to 31%, to Coke’s 19% (see Exhibit 8b). No Non-CSD beverages complicated Coke’s and Pepsi’s traditional production and distribution processes. While bottlers could easily manage some types of alternative beverages (e. g. , cold -filled Lipton Brisk), other types required costly new equipment and changes in production, warehousing, and distribution practices (e. g. , hot-filled Lipton Iced Tea). In many cases, Coke and Pepsi paid more than half the cost of these investments. The few bottlers that invested in these capabilities either purchased concentrate or other additives from Coke and Pepsi (e. g. , Dasani’s mineral packet) or compensated the franchiser through per-unit royalty fees (e. g. , Aquafina). Most bottlers, however, did not invest in hot-fill (for some iced tea), reverse-osmosis (for some bottled water), or other specialized equipment, and instead bought their finished product from a central regional plant or one owned directly by Coca-Cola or PepsiCo. They would then distribute these alongside their own bottled products at a percentage mark-up. More split pallets32 led to slightly higher labor costs, but otherwise did not significantly affect distribution practices. Despite these complicated and evolving arrangements, higher retail prices for alternative beverages meant that margins for the franchiser, bottler, and distributor were consistently higher than on CSDs. Internationalizing the Cola Wars Do As domestic demand appeared to plateau, Coke and Pepsi increasingly looked overseas for new growth. Throughout the 1990s, new access to markets in China, India, and Eastern Europe stimulated some of the most intense battles of the cola wars. In many international markets, per capita consumption levels remained a fraction of those in the United States. For example, while the 27 Marcy Magiera, â€Å"Pepsi Moving Fast To Get Beyond Colas,† Advertising Age, July 5, 1993. 28 Greising, p. 233. 29 Bonnie Herzog, â€Å"PepsiCo, Inc. : The Joy of Growth,† Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation, September 8, 2000. 30 Maxwell, p. 152-3. 31 Betsy McKay, â€Å"Juiced Up: Pepsi Edges Past Coke, and It has Nothing to Do With Cola,† The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2000. 32 Pallets are hard beds, usually of wood, used to organize, store, and transport products. A split pallet carries more than one product type. 13 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 average American drank 874 eight-ounce cans of CSDs in 1999, the average Chinese drank 22. In 1999, Coke held a world market share of 53%, compared to Pepsi’s 21% and Cadbury Schweppes’ 6%. Among major overseas markets, Coke dominated in Western Europe and much of Latin America, while Pepsi had marked presence in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (see Exhibit 9). C By the end of World War II, Coca-Cola was the largest international producer of soft drinks. Coke steadily expanded its overseas operations in the 1950s, and the name Coca-Cola soon became a synonym for American culture. Coke built brand presence in developing markets where soft drink consumption was low but potential was large, such as Indonesia: With 200 million inhabitants, a med ian age of 18, and per capita consumption of 9 eight-ounce cans of soda a year, one Coke executive noted that â€Å"they sit squarely on the equator and everybody’s young. It’s soft drink heaven. 33 By the early 1990s, Coke’s CEO Roberto Goizueta said, â€Å"Coca-Cola used to be an American company with a large international business. Now we are a large international company with a sizable American business. †34 No Following Coke, Pepsi entered Europe soon after World War II, and—benefiting from Arab and Soviet exclusion of Coke—into the Middle East and Soviet bloc in the early 1970s. However, Pepsi put less emphasis on its international operations during the subsequent decade. In 1980, international sales accounted for 62% of Coke’s soft drink volume, versus 20% for Pepsi. Pepsi rejoined the international battles in the late 1980s, realizing that many of its foreign bottling operations were inefficiently run and â€Å"woefully uncompetitive. †35 In the early 1990s, Pepsi utilized a niche strategy which targeted geographic areas where per capitas were relatively established and the markets presented high volume and profit opportunities. These were often â€Å"Coke fortresses,† and Pepsi put its guerilla tactics to work, noting that â€Å"as big as Coca-Cola is, you certainly don’t want a shootout at high noon,† said Wayne Calloway, then CEO of PepsiCo. 6 Coke struck back; in one high-profile coup in 1996, Pepsi’s longtime bottler in Venezuela defected to Coke, temporarily reducing Pepsi’s 80% share of the cola market to nearly nothing overnight. In the late 1990s, Pepsi moved even further away from head-to-head competition and instead concentrated on emerging markets that were still up for grabs. â€Å"We kept beating our heads in markets that Coke won 20 years ago,† explained Calloway’s successor, Roger Enrico. â€Å"That is a very difficult proposition. 37 In 1999, PepsiCo’s bottler sales were up 5% internationally and its operating profit from overseas was up 37%. Market share gains were reported in most of Pepsi-Cola International’s top 25 markets, including increases of 10% in India, 16% in China, and more than 100% in Russia. By 2000, international sales accounted for 62% of Coke’s and 9% of Pepsi’s revenues. Do Concentrate producers encountered various obstacles in international operations, including cultural differences, political instability, regulations, price controls, advertising restrictions, foreign exchange controls, and lack of infrastructure. When Coke attempted to acquire Cadbury Schweppes’ international practice, for example, it ran into regulatory roadblocks in Europe and in Mexico and Australia, where Coke’s market shares exceed 50%. On the other hand, Japanese domestic-protection price controls in the 1950s greased the skids for Coke’s high concentrate prices and high profitability, and in India, mandatory certification for bottled drinking water caused several local brands to fold. 33 John Huey, â€Å"The World’s Best Brand,† Fortune, May 31, 1993. 34John Huey, â€Å"The World’s Best Brand,† Fortune, May 31, 1993. 5 Larry Jabbonsky, â€Å"Room to Run,† Beverage World, August 1993. 36The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1991. 37 John Byrne, â€Å"PepsiCo’s New Formula: How Roger Enrico is Remaking the Company†¦ and Himself,† BusinessWeek, April 10, 2000. 14 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617- 783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century To cope with immature distribution networks, Coke and Pepsi created their own ground-up, and often novel, systems. Coke introduced vending machines to Japan, a channel that eventually accounted for more than half of Coke’s Japanese sales. 38 In India, Pepsi found the most prominent businessman in town and gave him exclusive distribution rights, tapping his connections to drive growth. Significantly, both Coke and Pepsi recognized local-market demands for non-cola products. In 2000, Coke carried more than 200 brands in Japan alone, most of which were teas, coffees, juices, and flavored water. In Brazil, Coke offered two brands of guarana, a popular caffeinated carbonated berry drink accounting for one-quarter of that country’s CSD sales, despite rivals’ TV ads ridiculing â€Å"gringo guarana. † tC When the economy foundered in certain parts of the world during the late 1990s, annual consumption declined in many regions. Major financial quakes in East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999 shook the cola giants, who had invested heavily in bottler infrastructure. From 1995 to 2000, Coke’s top line slowed to an average annual growth of less than 3%. Profits actually fell from $3. 0 billion in 1995 to $2. 2 billion in 2000. In Russia, where Coke invested more than $700 million from 1991 to 1999, the collapse of the economy caused sales to drop by as much as 60% and left Coke’s seven bottling plants operating at 50% capacity. In Brazil, its third-largest market, Coke lost more than 10% of its 54% market share to low-cost local drinks produced by family-owned bottlers exempt from that country’s punitive soft-drink taxes. In 1998, Coke estimated that a strong dollar cut into net sales by 9%. Pepsi, with its relatively lower overseas presence, was less affected by the crises. Nonetheless, Pepsi also subsidized its bottlers while experiencing a drop in sales. No Despite these financial setbacks, both Coke and Pepsi expressed confidence in the future growth of international consumption and used the downturn as an opportunity to snatch up bottlers, distribution, and even rival brands. To increase sales, they tried to make their products more affordable through measures such as refundable glass packaging (instead of plastic) and cheaper 6. ounce bottles. The End of an Era? At the turn of the century, growth of cola sales in the United States appeared to have plateaued. Coke and Pepsi were investing hundreds of millions of dollars to shore up international bottlers operating at low capacity. The companies’ overall growth in soft drink sales were falling short of precedent and of investors’ expectations. Was the fundamental nature of the cola wars changing? Would the parameters of this new rivalry include reduced profitability and stagnant growth— inconceivable under the old form of rivalry? Do Or, were the troubles of the late 1990s just another step in the evolution of two of America’s most successful companies? In 2001, non-cola, non-carbs, and even convenience foods offered diversification and growth potential. Low international per capita soft drink consumption figures hinted at tremendous opportunity in the competition for worldwide â€Å"throat share. † Noted a Coke executive in 2000, â€Å"the cola wars are going to be played now across a lot of different battlefields. †39 38 June Preston, â€Å"Things May Go Better for Coke amid Asia Crisis, Singapore Bottler Says,† Journal of Commerce, June 29, 1998, . A3. 39 Betsy McKay, â€Å"Juiced Up: Pepsi Edges Past Coke, and It has Nothing to Do With Cola,† The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2000. 15 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Do Exhibit 1 702-442 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. No U. S. Industry Consumption Statistics 1970 1975 1981 1985 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 Historical Carbonated Soft Drink Consumption Cases (millions) Gallons/capita As a % of total beverage consumption 3,090 22. 7 2. 4 3,780 26. 3 14. 4 5,180 34. 2 18. 7 6,500 40. 3 22. 4 7,914 46. 9 26. 1 8,160 47. 2 26. 3 8,608 50. 0 27. 2 8,952 50. 9 28. 1 9,489 52. 0 28. 8 9,880 54. 0 30. 0 9,930 53. 6 29. 4 9,950 53. 0 29. 0 22. 7 22. 8 18. 5 35. 7 6. 5 5. 2 1. 3 1. 8 26. 3 21. 8 21. 6 33 1. 2 6. 8 7. 3 4. 8 1. 7 2 34. 2 20. 6 24. 3 27. 2 2. 7 6. 9 7. 3 6 2. 1 2 40. 3 24. 0 25. 0 26. 9 4. 5 7. 8 7. 3 6. 2 2. 4 1. 8 46. 9 24. 3 24. 2 26. 2 8. 1 8. 8 7. 0 5. 4 2. 0 1. 5 47. 2 23. 3 23. 8 26. 5 8. 2 9. 1 6. 8 5. 4 2. 0 0. 6 1. 4 50. 0 22. 8 23. 2 23. 3 9. 6 9. 4 7. 1 4. 8 1. 7 0. 9 1. 3 50. 9 22. 3 22. 8 1. 3 10. 1 9. 5 6. 8 4. 9 1. 8 1. 1 1. 2 52. 0 22. 3 22. 7 20. 2 11. 0 9. 7 6. 9 4. 8 1. 8 1. 1 1. 2 54. 0 22. 1 22. 0 18. 0 11. 8 10. 0 6. 9 4. 7 2. 0 1. 3 1. 3 53. 6 22. 2 21. 9 17. 2 12. 6 10. 2 7. 0 4. 6 2. 0 1. 4 1. 3 53. 0 22. 2 21. 7 16. 8 13. 2 10. 4 7. 0 4. 6 2. 0 1. 5 1. 2 114. 5 126. 5 133. 3 146. 2 154. 4 154. 3 154. 0 152. 6 153. 6 154. 1 153. 8 153. 6 68 56 49. 2 36. 3 28. 1 28. 2 28. 5 29. 9 28. 9 28. 4 28. 7 28. 9 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 U. S. Liquid Consumption Trends (gallons/capita) Carbonated soft drinks Beer Milk Coffeea Bottled Waterb Juices Teaa Powdered drinks Wine Sports Drinksc Distilled spirits Subtotal Tap water/hybrids/all others Totald tC opy Source: John C. Maxwell, Beverage Digest Fact Book 2001, and The Maxwell Consumer Report, Feb. 3, 1994; Adams Liquor Handbook, casewriter estimates. aFrom 1985, coffee and tea data are based on a three-year moving average to counter-balance inventory swings, thereby portraying consumption more realistically. bBottled water includes all packages, single-serve, and bulk. cSports drinks included in â€Å"Tap water/hybids/all others† pre-1992. This analysis assumes that each person consumes on average one-half gallon of liquid per day. -16- Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century Advertisement Spending for the Top 10 CSD Brands ($ millions) op y Exhibit 2 Share of market 2000 Total market 20. 4 13. 6 8. 7 7. 2 6. 6 6. 3 5. 3 2. 0 1. 7 1. 1 1999 20. 3 13. 8 8. 5 7. 1 6. 8 3. 6 5. 1 2. 1 1. 8 1. 1 Advertisement Spendinga per 2000 2000 1999 share point 207. 3 130. 0 1. 2 50. 5 84. 0 83. 6 0. 5 44. 5 NA 2. 7 148. 9 91. 1 25. 5 37. 1 68. 4 71. 3 0. 8 39. 2 NA 2. 9 tC Coke Classic Pepsi-Cola Diet Coke Mountain Dew Sprite Dr Pepper Diet Pepsi 7UP Caffeine Free Diet Coke Barq’s root beer Total top 10 702-442 72. 9 72. 9 10. 2 9. 6 0. 1 7. 0 12. 7 13. 3 0. 1 22. 3 NA 2. 4 604. 2 485. 2 8. 3 707. 6 650. 0 NA Source: â€Å"Top 10 Soft-Drink Brands,† Advertising Age, September 24, 2001; casewriter estimates. aAdvertisement spending measured in 11 media channels from CMR. Brands and total market in 192-oz cases from Do No Beverage Digest/Maxwell. Case volume from all channels. 17 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. arvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century U. S. Soft Drink Market Share by Case Volume (percent) 1966 op y Exhibit 3 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2000E 27. 7 1. 5 1. 4 2. 8 33. 4 28. 4 1. 8 1. 3 3. 2 34. 7 26. 2 2. 6 2. 6 3. 9 35. 3 2